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In this study, I evaluate a hypothesis regarding whether a dyadic preference similarity guides 
foreign policy behavior. The existing literature in international relations highlights the importance of 
domestic institutions and international factors, yet the mutual preference similarity has not been fully 
explored in interstate economic cooperation research. Quantitative studies on commercial cooperation 
have largely ignored the impact of mutual preference similarity on international economic foreign 
policy. I revisit a claim that international economic cooperation can be explained mainly as the 
product of similar political and economic institutions. I argue that the similarity of mutual preference 
between dyads is likely to affect the probability of interstate economic cooperation. Omitting the 
variance of mutual preferences leads to an incomplete picture of commercial cooperation. I show that 
an index of states’ dyadic preference similarity based on correlation between roll-call voting in the 
United Nations General Assembly accounts for much of the variance in economic cooperation 
propensity. If state preferences coincide over divergent issues, then their commercial ties become 
stronger. I conclude that the preference similarity of governments’ foreign policy goals affects the 
willingness of states to form Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
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Since the early 1980s, many countries have concluded Preferential Trading Arrangements 
(PTAs). Almost every country in the world is a member of a PTA. Currently sixty percent of 
world trade occurs within such preferential trading blocs. Although a recent surge of PTAs 
has stimulated many debates, we lack a complete understanding as to what drives states to 
make a commitment to international trade agreements. This study seeks to improve our 
understanding of why countries rush to join international trade agreements by examining the 
impact of mutual preference similarity constraints.  
The leading theories in international relations highlight the importance of domestic 
economic institution and political institution, while the mutual preference similarity factor 
has not yet been explored in extant research. Few quantitative studies on interstate 
commercial cooperation have investigated the impact of mutual state preferences on 
international economic foreign policy. It is unquestioned that the decision-making process of 
states is influenced by what they want to be achieved. If that is the case, omitting an analysis 
of states’ preferences leads to an incomplete picture of dynamics of commercial cooperation. 
To fill this gap, I investigate whether interstate economic cooperation can be explained by 
the similarity of states’ mutual preferences. I show that an index of states’ dyadic preference 
similarity based on correlation between roll-call voting in the United Nations General 
Assembly accounts for much of the variance in cooperation propensity. To be more specific, 
the states’ dyadic preference similarity accounts for the propensity to conclude international 
trade agreements. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
Competing arguments have shown that states choose trade policies because of external 
factors (Mansfield 1998), domestic factors such as preferences of political leaders (Rogowski 
1989), preferences of pressure groups (Grossman and Helpman 1995), political institutions 
(Gaubatz 1996, Verdier 1998, Remmer 1998, Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2001), and 
economic institutions (Souva 2004). 
A growing body of recent literature argues that domestic institutional constraints affect 
trade policy. Change in political regimes may be “the institutional
 
change that helps explain 
global free trade” (Milner 1999). Scholars have found a positive link between international 
trade and democracy (Gaubatz 1996, Verdier 1998, Remmer 1998). Barbieri and Schneider, 
however, draw a different conclusion about the link between democracy and trade (Barbieri 
and Schneider 1999). Penubarti and Ward (2000) maintain that previous studies rely on the 
misspecification of the trade model and fail to account for the spatial context of international 
trade flows.  Therefore, debates over the monadic impact of
 
regime type on the propensity of 
free trade policy are still incomplete (Reinhardt 2000). Some political scientists discuss the 
dyadic effect of democracy on trade cooperation (Simmons 2000). Mansfield, Milner, and 
Rosendorff (2001) show that “democratic dyads
 
are more likely to be proponents of 




ones”. On the other hand, Verdier 
(1998) argues that democracies tend to choose protection due to the political clash caused by 
trade. Mansfield and Bronson (1997) also argue that democratic dyads are not more likely to 
cooperate in terms of treaty counts and trade flows. Overall, empirical evidences have been
 
presented about the independent effect of democracy on trade cooperation.  
Another important question in the international relations literature concerns what factors 
lead to peaceful interactions. Studies suggest that democratic countries are less likely to go to 
war because democratic countries are status quo powers with similar interests and 
satisfactions (Lemke and Werner 1996; Lemke and Reed 1996). Gartzke (1998, 2000) 
further shows that states’ preference similarity accounts for much of the lack of militarized 
conflicts between democracies. Studies demonstrate the importance of state preference in the 
likelihood of war behavior. These studies mainly show that similarity of interests matters in 
international interaction. The other implication is that countries with similar preferences or 
norms promote peaceful interactions. That is, they are more likely to form security alliances 
or conclude cooperative economic arrangements. For example, jointly satisfied states with 
shared preferences form security ties such as NATO or economic agreements such as EU.  
Current analyses are not effective in resolving the puzzle of how preference similarity 
affects the way preferences are aggregated into interstate commercial cooperation. I show 
how the preference similarity provides insights for a country’s decision to join PTAs. This 
preference explanation also provides a new framework for revealing what has been 
overlooked in efforts to explain the puzzling behavior of countries that rush to join PTAs. 
Commercial ties and flows do not need to be influenced by democratic norms and 
institutions if countries have mutually similar preferences or willingness to cooperate 
commercially. It is more preference similarity and shared interests than democracy per se 
that explain economic cooperation. In other words, democratic expansion does not 
necessarily drive an interstate economic cooperation. Rather, the similarity of state 
preferences guides how states behave in commercial relations. If states are mutually satisfied 
and have similar interests, it is not difficult to predict that they will be cooperative with each 




other in political and economic issues. In other words, if state preferences converge over 
divergent issues, then they tend to increase commercial ties. States with similar preferences 
and shared interests are more likely to trade more freely with each other, because preference 
similarity lessens mutual political conflict and increases each other’s economic ties 
(Reinhardt 2000). They will have fewer problems in adjusting their trade policies. In the 
same context, countries with conflicting preferences will have more tensions. Conflicts and 
tensions will negatively influence their economic interaction. Political tensions with 
dissimilar preferences lead to a decreased level of mutual commerce. Even in the shadow of 
serious political tension, economic ties can develop. However, such examples are rare. The 
member countries of the EU have more similar preferences and shared satisfactions over 
divergent issues than do the countries in Asia. If the U.S. and Jordan have similar 
preferences and are mutually satisfied, they would increase business exchanges even if they 
have different political institutions. The Free Trade Agreements between the U.S. and 
Central American countries or between the U.S. and Israel are other examples.  
Having similar political and economic institutions is not the only factor which guides 
states’ commercial behavior. Strategic willingness to conclude a trade agreement also 
becomes an important variable in this context. Simmons suggests that the presence of a 
democratic regime has no independent effect on the propensity to commit to openness 
(Simmons 2000). Moreover, Dai suggests, “domestic political institutions alone are not 
sufficient to predict a higher level of cooperation among democracies regardless of the 
preferences of the decision maker” (Dai 2002). Consequently, theories that incorporate both
 
preferences and institutions are necessary, because “both are jointly determined” (Milner 
1999). More recently, scholars have claimed that interplay between domestic institutions and 
preferences should be included within the literature regarding the recent change of external 
trade policy across countries (Milner 1999). A significant contributor to economic 
cooperation has been missed in previous studies. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to 
provide a more convincing theoretical framework and empirical support incorporating 
preferences in order to explain why countries pursue interstate commercial cooperation by 
entering PTAs. I evaluate the hypothesis that the similarity of governments’ foreign policy 
goals affects the willingness of states to form free trade agreements. This study shows that 
ignoring preferences in explaining economic cooperation is likely to lead us to incomplete 





The common techniques for analyzing statistical models with dichotomous dependent 
variables are logit and probit. However, logit and probit techniques require assumptions of 
independence among cases that are inappropriate in a time-series cross-section context. 
Given that the dependent variable of this study is comprised of the decision to join PTAs 
over time, there must be autocorrelations from year to year per dyad.
1
 To account for this 
                                                          
1 It is notable that many of the existing PTAs are interrelated. “The countries of the European Union 
and Mexico belong to more than 10 agreements. Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile and some 
Central American countries belong to between 5 and 10 agreements. Most other WTO members 
belong to at least one agreement. The main exceptions to this pattern are Hong Kong, China, Japan, 
Macau and Mongolia” (Crawford and Laird 2000).  
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characteristic of the data, I rely on a generalized estimating equation (GEE) to analyze the 
data. Liang and Zeger formalized a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs) approach to 
deal with correlated data involving repeated observations over time. According to Zorn, the 
GEE technique is appropriate to use “when the standard assumption that observations in the 
data are conditionally independent is called into question.” GEE analysis uses quasi-
maximum likelihood estimation techniques to control the effect of time dependence on 
observations in the context of time-series cross-section data. The GEE method involves panel 
data with a binary or more complicated dependent variable.     
I present this analysis with an indicator for each variable, ascribing the weak link 
principle. In a dyadic analysis, it is difficult to measure major concepts and variables. For 
example, joint democracy is a difficult concept to measure. Some studies have used a 
dummy variable, which takes on a value of 1 when both states’ democracy scores are above 
some threshold. While others have chosen the lower of the two democracy scores as 
sufficiently reflecting the level of democracy needed for the dyad, I selected the “weak link” 
procedure of relying on the lower of the two democracy scores. Recently, it has become 
much more popular to use the separate variables such as high democracy and low democracy 
that identify the higher and lower of the two democracy scores in a dyad. This approach was 
first used by Dixon based on the weakest link assumption that suggests that the democracy 
level of the lower democracy state would drive the regime type relationship in any dyad. 
However, there are variations on the inclusion of variables based on the weakest link 
argument. Some studies include both high democracy and low democracy (Gartzke 2000, 
Oneal and Russett 1997), while others use low democracy alone (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 
1998, Oneal and Russett 1999). Following Oneal and Russett’s logic of the “weakest link in 
the chain,” I identify the lower of the two democracy scores as the level of democracy in the 
dyad. 
 
3.1. The Decision to Sign International Trade Agreements 
 
I use the decision of a state to enter a PTA as the dependent variable from 1946 to 1996 
with 150 countries. Commitment to a PTA can be seen as a costly signal by governments to 
convey their future willingness to eliminate trade barriers. Trade agreement commitment is 
one way for governments to secure their credibility if international markets doubt their 
willingness to maintain and enhance trade liberalization policies. In this vein, employing the 
conclusion of a PTA as a dependent variable is a reasonable way to measure the willingness 
of a country to cooperate with other countries in increasing commerce. I take preferential 
trade agreements, free trade agreements, customs unions, common markets, and monetary 
unions as a dependent variable. The dependent variable is coded to indicate when states form 
or join a PTA where we observe 1 if this occurs and 0 otherwise for dyad i during year t. 




We cannot measure the similarity of preference directly, but we can measure the “degree 
to which actors converge or diverge in their expressions of representative behavior” (Gartzke 
2000). This is a proxy for the similarity of preferences. Gartzke and Jo’s (2002) Affinity of 
Nations Index has been used in many studies to reflect similarity of states’ foreign policy 
positions (Oneal and Russett 1999; Gartzke 2000). The Affinity of Nations Index reflects the 




similarity of state preferences based on voting positions of dyads in the United Nations 
General Assembly. The index measures the degree of similarity of voting by all members of 
the United Nations General Assembly from 1946-1996.  The Affinity of Nations Index gives 
yearly values of voting similarity for each member of the General Assembly relative to each 
other member, in a range from -1 to 1. A score of 1 indicates complete voting similarity 
between the two countries. A score of -1 indicates complete dissimilarity.  The values are 
calculated in two different ways:  using a two-category approach which measures votes cast 
(Yes or No) and ignores abstentions; and a three-category approach which considers 
abstentions to be an intermediate value. It seems appropriate to include abstentions in an 
analysis of voting behavior as they usually represent a political signal. This study uses scores 
of U.N. voting using S scores for voting affinity on all roll call votes cast in the United 
Nations General Assembly. Signorino and Ritter (1999) develop the S score as a measure of 
foreign policy similarity. This measure means that “the closer two states are in the policy 
space – i.e., the closer their revealed policy positions – the more similar their revealed policy 
positions. The further apart two states are in the policy space, the more dissimilar their 
revealed policy positions” (Signorino and Ritter 1999). The S indicator is “calculated as: S = 
1 - 2*(d)/dmax, where d is the sum of the metric distances between dyad members (in terms 
of votes) in a given year and dmax is the largest possible metric distance of those votes” 
(Gartzke and Jo 2002). S scores are calculated based on United Nations votes on three 
different dimensions – “yes” for approval and “no” for disapproval, as well as an 
intermediate dimension for those cases where a state “abstained.” The Affinity of Nations 




I use the Polity data to capture the level of democracy. Polity data includes five factors 
that capture the institutional differences between democracies and autocracies: 1) the 
competitiveness of the process for selecting a country’s chief executive, 2) the openness of 
this process, 3) the extent to which institutional constraints limit a chief executive’s decision-
making authority, 4) the competitiveness of political participation within a country, and 5) 
the degree to which binding rules govern political participation within it (Jaggers and Gurr 
1996).  
 
3.4. Control Variables 
 
It is important to include other confounding variables that may be responsible for a 
commitment to PTAs. Studies (Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff 2002; Mansfield 1998) find 
that political factors such as alliance positively influence the likelihood of leaders to make a 
commitment to a PTA. That is, “alliances are likely to promote free trade because countries 
are more likely to enter PTAs with their allies when they trust the credibility of their mutual 
political relationship. When a leader is concerned about the possibility that his ally will 
cooperate with other opponents, he is less likely to be willing to enter a preferential trade 
agreement with that ally” (Mansfield 1998). Previous studies also found that states enter a 
free trade agreement if they are members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) or WTO and if they are not involved in a war (Dispute) (Mansfield 1998). Studies 
also show the effects of hegemony on the expansion of PTAs. To a large extent, the growth 
in PTAs results from the decline in U.S. leadership and power. That is, states join PTAs 
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more extensively as hegemony declines. In this context, I control for the effect of hegemony 
(Hegemony) (Mansfield 1998). Hegemony can be calculated as “the percentage of total 
global trade (the sum of imports and exports) conducted by the state engaging in the most 
commerce in year t - 1” (Mansfield 1998). The geographic distance between countries 
(Distance) is also controlled for because this factor stimulates the formation of PTAs 
(Mansfield 1998). Controls for other economic conditions are also included to observe the 
effects of institutional variables on trade relations. Domestic economic factors can influence 
a leader’s decision to join a PTA. For example, states with larger home markets are less 
likely to be motivated to enter free trade agreements compared to states with smaller home 
markets (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002). Thus, the model includes the size of their 
economy (GDP) using the lagged per capita real GDP as a control in model. Empirical 
studies of trade policy also emphasize the level of macroeconomic conditions as a cause for 
increasing levels of protection. Trade is a field where decision-makers tend to face strong 
domestic pressures for import protection. When economic conditions are bad, domestic 
pressures for protection may suddenly occur. In other words, economic conditions influence 
the level of pressures for protection. “Recessions may lead states to join a PTA comprising 
countries whose principal industries do not rival each other. Doing so is one way a 
government can address domestic pressures for protection by restricting imports” (Mansfield 
1998). If there are recessions, forming a PTA rather than imposing unilateral trade barriers 
gives some benefits to member countries of the GATT/WTO.  
 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Results from the models
2
 show that the estimation results are consistent with theoretical 
expectations.    
Table 1 presents the results
3
 of the effects of preference similarity on the determination of 
leaders to commit to policy change for the formation of international trade agreements. The 
level of preference similarity has a strong positive effect on the commitment to tariff 
reduction agreements. In other words, the propensity of the determination of leaders to join 
Preferential Trade Agreements increases as the level of preference similarity increases. 
These results are consistent and robust across models with different specifications. Also, in 
two models, democracy continues to have a strongly positive effect on the propensity of 
commitment to PTAs. That is, the propensity of commitment to sign PTAs increases between 
democracies. The inclusion of an interaction term between preference similarity and 
democracy shows the same result.  
The control variables behave as expected. The results indicate that the economic size of 
countries affects the likelihood that leaders sign PTAs. The estimates are negative and 
statistically significant. This means that as the economic size of a country increases, the 
propensity of its leaders to join PTAs decreases. Economic trade level and dispute are not 
uniformly statistically significant. Yet, geographically close states are more likely to enter  
                                                          
2 I include both restricted model (all independent variables and control variables are included) and 
unrestricted model (preference similarity excluded model) to make a contrast between two models to 
highlight the impact of mutual preference similarity to join PTAs.    
3 I use the command as xtgee………………. Family (bin), link(logit), robust. 
 




Table 1 Preference Similarity and the Leader’s Determination to Join PTAs  
(Dyadic analysis) 
 
Dependent Variable: PTAs Unrestricted Model Restricted Model 





















































p 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald test chi2 1385.89 869.41 
N 206488 128199 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
Robust Standard Errors for Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
 
into PTAs. Geographic proximity is statistically significant across models. Colonial history 
has a positive effect on the commitment to join PTAs and is statistically significant. 
Hegemony is negative and statistically significant. Alliance has a positive effect on the 
commitment to join a PTA and statistically significant across models.  The GATT variable 
shows a positive sign. Countries that are parties to the GATT are more likely to sign a PTA, 











In this research, I present the condition in which political leaders are motivated to pursue 
international trade agreements. Among other factors, I focus on the effects of state 
preferences on the likelihood of political leaders concluding a PTA to provide a better 
understanding of interstate commercial cooperation. I find that leaders have greater political 
incentives to conclude trade agreements as their interest similarity with other potential trade 
partners grows. The result also confirms that democratic leaders are more likely to form trade 
agreements with each other. Based on empirical results, this study demonstrates that shared 
interest and mutual preference similarity constraints provide an important motivation for 
leaders to pursue PTAs. In doing so, this study suggests that not only does the domestic 
regime type influence the likelihood of leaders to conclude PTAs, but also that analysis of 
state preference similarity should be incorporated in exploring interstate commercial ties. 
That is, mutual preferences clearly influence policy action at the international level. Current 
analyses are not effective in filling the gap of how preference similarity affects the way 
preference similarities are aggregated into interstate commercial cooperation. I show how 
mutual preference similarity provides significant insights for a country’s decision to join 
trading blocs. This preference explanation provides a new framework for showing what has 
been overlooked in efforts to explain the behavior of countries that rush to join PTAs. 
Commercial ties and exchanges do not need to be influenced by democratic norms and 
institutions if countries have mutually similar preferences and incentives to cooperate 
commercially. These findings highlight the fact that accounts involving preferences make a 
significant contribution towards our understanding of international political economy, 
especially in explaining a leader’s willingness to commit to international trade agreements. 
This study is beneficial to international political economy research in a number of ways. 
Through this study, we have a better understanding on whether preference similarity 
contributes to leaders’ willingness to join PTAs. Such a finding has obvious policy 
implications for leaders, policymakers, and international political economists. This is 
especially of interest to practitioners given the explosive surge of PTAs among leaders in 
different regions. Previously, studies have suggested that the proliferation of democracies 
will promote an increased level of economic cooperation in the form of international trade 
agreements. However, this study proves that the proliferation of democracies will be less 
successful in motivating countries to conclude international trade agreements if countries 
have heterogeneous interests and preferences. Omitting the role of preference in trading 
blocs leads us to make incomplete conclusions in understanding the dynamic process of 
PTAs. 
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